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I. INTRODUCTION

Texas resident John McLemore wanted more information about
security improvements at the tennis courts, swimming pools, and
recreation center in his community.' He requested this information from
the Brushy Creek Municipal Utility District (Brushy Creek),' a suburb near
Austin, Texas.3 The information he sought was contained in a contract
pertaining to security and video surveillance at these Brushy Creek
recreational facilities.4 Brushy Creek, in turn, requested guidance from the
state Office of the Attorney General as to whether it had to provide
McLemore with the information in the contract.'
Brushy Creek contended that it did not have to disclose this
information because terrorists might use the information to target these
recreational facilities, which Brushy Creek claimed were part of its critical
infrastructure.6 Under the statutory scheme created by the Texas Freedom
of Information Act7 and a new state law passed in June 2003,8 documents
may be confidential if they identify the technical details of particular
vulnerabilities of critical infrastructure to an act of terrorism.9 Information
may also be confidential if it relates to the specifications, operating
procedures, or location of a security system used to protect public or
private property from an act of terrorism or related criminal activity.' °
In November 2003, Assistant Attorney General Denis C. McElroy
responded to Brushy Creek's request for guidance with an open records
letter ruling." McElroy wrote that Brushy Creek had "failed to explain
1. Texas Open Records Letter Ruling No. OR2003-8302 (2003), Texas Office of the
Attorney General, availableathttp://www.oag.state.tx.us/opinopen/orl50abbott/orl2003/orO3 8302.
htm (last visited Oct. 27, 2004).
2. Id.
3. See Brushy Creek Municipal Utility District Web Site, at http://www.brushycreekmud.
com/information.ivnu (last visited Aug. 5, 2004).
4. Texas Open Records Letter Ruling No. OR2003-8302, 5 (2003).
5. Id. at 1.
6. See id.at 4-5; see also TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 421.001(2) (Vernon 2003) (defining
critical infrastructure as including "all public or private assets, systems, and functions vital to the
security, governance, public health and safety, economy, or morale of the state or the nation.").
7. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 552.101 (Vernon 2003).
8. 2003 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 1312 (Vernon).
9. TEx. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 418.181 (Vernon 2003).
10. Id. § 418.182.
11. According to the Texas Office of the Attorney General web site, open records letter
rulings, also called informal letter rulings, are
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how recreation centers or tennis and swimming pool facilities constitute
'critical infrastructure' for purposes of [the Texas law]. ' ' 2 Brushy Creek
also "failed to establish that release of security measures at these
recreational facilities will 'identify the technical details of particular
vulnerabilities of critical infrastructure[.] ' '"' 3 McElroy further stated that
Brushy Creek did not claim that the tennis courts, swimming pools, and
recreation center were potential terrorist targets, nor did Brushy Creek
allege that the purpose of the security system was to protect these
recreational facilities from terrorism or related crime. 4 Therefore, Brushy
Creek could not withhold any of the information in the contract. 5
Critical infrastructure, as defined in the Uniting and Strengthening
America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and
Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT Act) and the Homeland
Security Act of 2002, generally includes "systems and assets, whether
physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or
destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on
security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or

based on established law and practice and are signed by assistant attorneys general
in the Open Records Division. Unlike Open Records Decisions, these informal
letter rulings are applicable only to the specific documents and circumstances
surrounding them; therefore, Open Records Letter Rulings should not be cited as
precedent when briefing to the Office of the Attorney General.
Attorney General of Texas Greg Abbott: Open Records Letter Rulings (ORLs), available at
http://www.oag.state.tx.us/opinopen/index-orl.shtml (last visited Nov. 7,2004). Accordingly, each
open records ruling discussed in this Note contains routine language stating its limitations. E.g.,
Texas Open Records Letter Ruling No. OR2003-8302, 8 (2003).
12. Texas Open Records Letter Ruling No. OR2003-8302, 5 (2003).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
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any combination of those matters. ' ' 6 The Homeland Security Act also
specifically defines "critical infrastructure information."' 7
New federal and state laws enacted since the September 11 terrorist
attacks and the creative application of existing laws such as the Freedom
of Information Act (FOIA) 8 may allow governments to chip away at the

16. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept
and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 1016(e), 115 Stat. 272, 400 (2001)
[hereinafter USA PATRIOT Act]; Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 2(4),
116 Stat. 2135, 2140 (2002); see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1, cmt.
n. 12(A) (2003), where critical infrastructure is defined as
systems and assets vital to national defense, national security, economic security,
public health or safety, or any combination of those matters. A critical
infrastructure may be publicly or privately owned. Examples of critical
infrastructures include gas and oil production, storage, and delivery systems, water
supply systems, telecommunications networks, electrical power delivery systems,
financing and banking systems, emergency services (including medical, police,
fire, and rescue services), transportation systems and services (including
highways, mass transit, airlines, and airports), and government operations that
provide essential services to the public.
Id.
17. Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 212(3), 116 Stat. 2135, 2151
(2002). The Homeland Security Act defines critical infrastructure information as
information not customarily in the public domain and related to the security of
critical infrastructure or protected systems (A) actual, potential, or threatened interference with, attack on, compromise of,
or incapacitation of critical infrastructure or protected systems by either physical
or computer-based attack or other similar conduct (including the misuse of or
unauthorized access to all types of communications and data transmission
systems) that violates Federal, State, or local law, harms interstate commerce of
the United States, or threatens public health or safety;
(B) the ability of any critical infrastructure or protected system to resist such
interference, compromise, or incapacitation, including any planned or past
assessment, projection, or estimate of the vulnerability of critical infrastructure or
a protected system, including security testing, risk evaluation thereto, risk
management planning, or risk audit; or
(C) any planned or past operational problem or solution regarding critical
infrastructure or protected systems, including repair, recovery, reconstruction,
insurance, or continuity, to the extent it is related to such interference,
compromise, or incapacitation.
Id.
18. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2003).
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public's ability to access critical infrastructure information.' 9 As of
February 2004, section 418.181 of the Texas Government Code2" was
possibly the only state law that was enacted post-September 11, that
restricted access to critical infrastructure information, and that had
spawned any legal controversy resulting in a written opinion or decision.2 '
The new Texas law was on the books for less than six months before at
least one local government in Brushy Creek attempted what was,22 at best,
a misguided application or, at worst, an abuse of the law.

19. Federal and state government officials began to demonstrate an intent to restrict access
to critical infrastructure information specifically as a method of terrorism prevention after
September 11, 2001. See discussion infra Parts II.B-D. Thus, the author used that date as the
starting point for this research. Using a white paper published in September2003 by The Reporter's
Committee for Freedom of the Press titled "Homefront Confidential," as a springboard, the author
selected for further research two federal cases that were decided post-September 11 and that dealt
with access to critical infrastructure information, discussed infra Part III. See THE REPORTERS
COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, HOMEFRONT CONFIDENTIAL, 64 (4th ed. 2003). The author
also selected for further research state laws that were passed post-September 11 and that clearly
affect access to critical infrastructure information. See id. at 75-85. The author then learned which
statutes in each state had been affected by the passage of those state laws, and which of those
statutes had been cited to by case law or administrative reports. As of February 2004, none of the
laws examined had been cited to by a case. Only section 418.181 and, to a lesser extent, section
418.182 of the Texas Government Code, which the Texas Legislature added in June 2003 by
passing House Bill 9, had been cited by any administrative decisions. See ALASKA STAT. §
40.25.120(a)(l0) (Michie 2003); ARIZ. REv. STAT. §§ 39-126, 49-205 (2003); CAL. GOV'T CODE
§§ 54954.5, 54957 (West 2002); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 10002(d), (g)(16) (2002); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 11 9.07(3)(ee) (West 2002); 2002 Fla. Laws ch. 2001-364; GA. CODE ANN. §§ 50-14-3, 5018-72 (2003); 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 140/7 (2003); 2003 I1l. Legis. Serv. 93-43 (West); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 22.7(43), (45), (46) (West 2003); 2002 Iowa Acts 1038, 1076, 1117; KAN. STAT. ANN. §§
45-215, 66-1233 (2003); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 402(3)(L), (M) (West 2003); NEV. REV.
STAT. 239C.210 (2003); VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3705 (Michie 2003). Other state laws restricting
access to critical infrastructure information, particularly those enacted in California and Kansas,
have been met with vocal opposition. See Letter from Thomas W. Newton, General Counsel,
California Newspaper Publishers Association to Sam Aanestad (R-Grass Valley), California State
Assemblyman (June 12, 2002)(opposing proposed amendments to AB 2645, which amended the
California Government Code in 2002, because the proposed amendments "would give state and
local agencies unprecedented discretion to withhold from the public virtually any drawing,
schematic, map, or image of public infrastructure."), available at http://www.cnpa.com/Leg/GA/
Letters/01-02/ab26453rd.htm (last visited Aug. 5, 2004); Randy Brown, Op-Ed on Freedom of
InformationDay, KAN. SUNSHINE COALITION FOROPENGOV'T, Mar. 12,2003 (opposing HB 2374,
which amended Kansas law through July 2004 to allow utility companies to "charge customers for
'homeland security' upgrades - without revealing the amount of the charge."), at http://www
sunshinecoalition.com/FOIday.htm (last visited Aug. 5, 2004).
20. See TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 418.181 (Vernon 2003) (making certain critical
infrastructure information confidential).
21. See supra text accompanying note 19.
22. TEx. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 418.181 (Vernon 2003).
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This Note will address the post-September 11 movement toward
broadening the definition of critical infrastructure information while
restricting public access to such critical infrastructure information.
Additionally, this Note will identify some new federal and state laws that
were crafted to prevent terrorist attacks by withholding critical
infrastructure information. This Note will examine recent applications of
FOIA exemptions and initial legal interpretations of the new Texas law
that restricts access to critical infrastructure information.23 Finally, this
Note will consider whether these early legal decisions and interpretations
reflect awareness of the potential for abuse of these new restrictions and
the consequences of such abuse.
Because little case law reflecting challenges to restrictions on access
to critical infrastructure information has emerged since September 11,
2001,24 this Note includes discussion of the issue in both the federal and
state systems, in order to analyze as much material as possible. Part II will
describe the statutory momentum toward cementing the Bush
Administration's policy of withholding critical infrastructure information.
Part 11 will examine two recent federal cases dealing with access to
critical infrastructure information that were decided in accordance with the
Bush Administration's policy. Part IV will demonstrate how some states'
legislatures have begun to consider the federal government policy toward
restricting this information. Texas, in particular, has enacted new laws and
is possibly the only state where legal officials have had an opportunity to
interpret them. Part V will compare those interpretations from Texas to
illustrate how one state consistently applies the restrictions fairly while
staying acutely aware of the potential for abuse - reflected in the
rejection of Brushy Creek's attempt to qualify the community tennis courts
as critical infrastructure. Part VI will analyze the overall response to the
federal policy and propose methods for continued vigilance against abuse
of critical infrastructure information protection. Part VII will summarize
the findings of this Note.

23. Id.
24. See supra text accompanying note 19.
25. See infra Part V.
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II.

BACKGROUND ON ACCESS TO CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
INFORMATION IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM

A. The Freedom of Information Act
Congress enacted the FOIA in 1966.26 The FOIA and subsequent
amendments establish the right of any person to access many federal
agency records, even when the records exist in an electronic format. 27 To
avoid disclosing information, the government may employ one of nine
exemptions in the FOIA. 2' However, the FOIA gives the public a statutory
26. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2003).
27. Harold C. Relyea, Access to GovernmentInformationin the UnitedStates,Congressional
Research Service, CRS Report for Congress, Library of Congress, 2 (updated Jan. 23, 2003).
28. The Freedom of Information Act generally requires that, upon request, federal agencies
provide information to the public, in whole or in part, except when the information is exempt under
5 U.S.C. § 552(b) because it is
(1) (A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to
be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in
fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive order;
(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency;
(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than section 552(b) of
this title), provided that such statute (A) requires that the matters be withheld from
the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on the issue, or (B)
establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of
matters to be withheld;
(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person
and privileged or confidential;
(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be
available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency;
(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would
constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;
(7) records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the
extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information (A)
could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings, (B)
would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, (C)
could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy, (D) could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential
source, including a State, local, or foreign agency or authority or any private
institution which furnished information on a confidential basis, and, in the case of
a record or information compiled by criminal law enforcement authority in the
course of a criminal investigation or by an agency conducting a lawful national
security intelligence investigation, information furnished by a confidential source,
(E) would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations
or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations
or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk
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cause of action, and the government has the burden of explaining in
federal court why the public may not access the information being
sought.29 Thousands of court decisions, in conjunction with the statute,
have created an elaborate system dictating when the government must
reveal information.3" Notwithstanding these exemptions, the ultimate goal
of the FOIA is disclosure.3 '
B. Post-September 11 Changes in Law andPolicy
One month after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, U.S.
Attorney General John Ashcroft circulated a memo to all federal
department and agency heads.32 In the memo, Ashcroft implemented a
legal standard for withholding information that differed significantly from
the standard supported by the Clinton Administration.33 The standard
permits refusal of FOIA requests whenever a "sound legal basis" exists.34
Ashcroft also assured the heads of all federal departments and agencies
that the Department of Justice would defend decisions to withhold

circumvention of the law, or (F) could reasonably be expected to endanger the life
or physical safety of any individual;
(8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared
by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation or
supervision of financial institutions; or
(9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning
wells.
5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2003).
29. HOUSE COMM. ON GOVT.

REFORM, 108TH CONG., A CITIZEN'S GUIDE ON USING THE

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT AND THE PRIVACY ACT OF

1974

TO REQUEST GOVERNMENT

RECORDS, 3 (2003) [hereinafter Citizen's Guide on FOIA], available at http://frwebgate.access.

gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=l 08 congreports&docid=f:hrl 72.108.pdf(last visited Aug.
5, 2004).
30. "There are thousands of court decisions interpreting the FOIA." Id. at 5.
31. "Above all, the statute requires Federal agencies to provide the fullest possible disclosure
of information to the public." Id. at 3.
32. Memorandum from Attorney General John Ashcroft, to Heads ofall Federal Departments
and Agencies (Oct. 12, 2001) [hereinafter Ashcroft Memo], at http://www.usdoj.gov/oip/
foiapost/2001foiapostl9.htm (last visited Aug. 5, 2004).
33. Id.; see also Kristen Elizabeth Uhl, Comment, The Freedom Of Information Act Post9/11: Balancing The Public'sRight To Know, CriticalInfrastructureProtection,and Homeland
Security, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 261,270-72 (2003) (explaining how the Clinton Administration based
its FOIA policy on a "presumption of disclosure.").
34. See Ashcroft Memo, supra note 32.
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information.35 Critics argue that Ashcroft's instructions sharply contrast
with the intent of the FOIA.36
Two weeks after publication of the Ashcroft memo, Congress passed
the USA PATRIOT Act.3 7 The USA PATRIOT Act generally aims, in part,
to prevent terrorist attacks.38 The USA PATRIOT Act also provides the
prevailing definition of critical infrastructure.39
In March 2002, Andrew Card, the White House Chief of Staff and
Assistant to President George W. Bush, provided additional guidance on
the safekeeping of government information via a memo to federal
agencies.4 ° The memo described steps an agency should take when
deciding how to respond to a request for information that is either
classified, previously unclassified or declassified, or considered sensitive
but unclassified.4 The memo prodded agencies to heed the Ashcroft memo
when fielding requests for information that might be sensitive but
unclassified and not otherwise exempt from disclosure.42
C. The Homeland Security Act
While the Bush Administration affected the way that the public
accesses critical infrastructure information by changing policy, Congress

35. Id.
36. See discussion infraPart VI; see also Restoration ofFreedom ofInformation Act of2003,
S. 609, 108th Cong. (2003).
37. Attorney General Ashcroft circulated his memo on October 12, 2001. Congress passed
the USA PATRIOT Act on October 26, 2001.
38. "An Act [t]o deter and punish terrorist acts in the United States and around the world, to
enhance law enforcement investigatory tools, and for other purposes." USA PATRIOT Act, Pub.
L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272, 272 (2001).
39. Critical infrastructure includes "systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital
to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a
debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any
combination ofthose matters." USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 10 16(e), 115 Stat. 272,
400 (2001).
40. Memoranda from Andrew Card, Assistant to the President and White House Chief of
Staff; Laura L.S. Kimberly, Acting Director of the Information Security Oversight Office in the
National Archives and Records Administration; and Richard L. Huff and Daniel J. Metcalfe, CoDirectors of the Office of Information and Privacy in the Department of Justice, to Heads of
Executive Departments and Agencies (Mar. 19, 2002) [hereinafter Card Memo], at
http://www.usdoj.gov/oip/foiapost/2002foiapostl0.htm (last visited Nov. 10, 2004).
41. Id; see, e.g., Genevieve J. Knezo, "Sensitive but Unclassified" and Other Federal
Security Controls on Scientific and Technical Information: History and Current Controversy,
Congressional Research Service, CRS Report for Congress, Library of Congress (updated July 2,
2003).
42. See Card Memo, supranote 40.
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tried to protect critical infrastructure information by enacting new
legislation. The Homeland Security Act,43 enacted on Nov. 25, 2002 to
create the cabinet-level Department of Homeland Security, adopts the
same definition of critical infrastructure as the USA PATRIOT Act 44 but
also goes on to define critical infrastructure information. 45 The Homeland
Security Act aims to assess weaknesses in homeland security by collecting
critical infrastructure information from private entities, which own about
eighty-five percent of the nation's critical infrastructure.46
To achieve this goal, certain provisions of the Homeland Security Act
protect critical infrastructure information that is voluntarily submitted by
private entities to the Department of Homeland Security from disclosure
under the FOIA or any state and local open records laws. 47 These
provisions of the Homeland Security Act are known collectively as the
Critical Infrastructure Information Act of 2002.48 While these provisions
enable the government to learn about weaknesses in privately-owned
43. Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002).
44. Id. § 2(4), at 2140; see supra text accompanying note 39.
45. The Homeland Security Act defines critical infiastructure information as
information not customarily in the public domain and related to the security of
critical infrastructure or protected systems (A) actual, potential, or threatened interference with, attack on, compromise of,
or incapacitation of critical infrastructure or protected systems by either physical
or computer-based attack or other similar conduct (including the misuse of or
unauthorized access to all types of communications and data transmission
systems) that violates Federal, State, or local law, harms interstate commerce of
the United States, or threatens public health or safety;
(B) the ability of any critical infrastructure or protected system to resist such
interference, compromise, or incapacitation, including any planned or past
assessment, projection, or estimate of the vulnerability of critical infrastructure or
a protected system, including security testing, risk evaluation thereto, risk
management planning, or risk audit; or
(C) any planned or past operational problem or solution regarding critical
infrastructure or protected systems, including repair, recovery, reconstruction,
insurance, or continuity, to the extent it is related to such interference,
compromise, or incapacitation.
Id. § 212(3), at 2151.
46. Press Release, Department of Homeland Security, DHS Launches Protected Critical
Infrastructure Information Program to Enhance Homeland Security, Facilitate Information Sharing
(Feb. 18,2004), athttp://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?content=-3250 (last visited Aug. 5,2004).
47. Homeland Security Act of2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, §§211-215, 116 Stat. 2135, 215055 (2002) [hereinafter Critical Infrastructure Information Act of 2002].
48. Id. § 211. The text of this Note will continue to refer to these provisions as part of the
Homeland Security Act.
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critical infrastructure and protect the submitter of the information from
civil liability in certain circumstances,49 critics argue that there is no
mechanism for the government to force the submitter to correct the
weaknesses."0
In 2004, the Department of Homeland Security announced the
Protected Critical Infrastructure Information Program (Program)5 and
published rules in the Code of Federal Regulations to implement this
system.12 The express purpose of the Program is to ensure that the
government knows about vulnerabilities in privately-held critical
infrastructure without making the information available to the public.53
However, the Program still may not entice wary private entities to
voluntarily share critical infrastructure information with the federal
government.54 Thus, such information would remain hidden from both the
49. Id. § 214(a)(1)C).
50. This enforcement issue is one of several criticisms against the Critical Infrastructure
Information Act of 2002. In general, "consumer advocates worry that companies will use the law
to hide existing health and safety problems from the public." Robert Block, U.S. Law Shields
Company Data Tied to Security, WALL ST. J., Feb. 18, 2004, availableat 2004 WL 56920373. To
address this general fear and other perceived loopholes, U.S. Sen. Patrick Leahy (D.-Vt.) and four
other senators introduced the Restoration of Freedom of Information Act of 2003 on March 12,
2003. S. 609, 108th Cong. (2003). See also Press Release, U.S. Sen. Patrick Leahy (D.-Vt.), Sideby-Side Analysis of the Leahy-Levin-Jeffords-Lieberman-Byrd Restoration of Freedom of
Information Act of 2003 ("Restore FOIA") and the Critical Infrastructure Information Subtitle of
the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Mar. 12, 2003), available at http://leahy.senate.gov/
press/200303/031203a.html (last visited Aug. 9, 2004). A companion bill was introduced in the
House of Representatives on June 19, 2003. H.R. 2526, 108th Cong. (2003).
51. See Press Release, supranote 46.
52. Protected Critical Infrastructure Information, 6 C.F.R. § 29 (2004).
53. Once Department of Homeland Security officials designate voluntarily submitted
information as Protected Critical Infrastructure Information, it is exempt from disclosure under the
Freedom ofInformation Act. See 6 C.F.R. § 29.8(g)(1) (2004). Furthermore, even ifthe information
is later released to a state or local government agency in accordance with the rules, the public may
not access the information using state or local open records laws. See 6 C.F.R. § 29.8(g)(2) (2004).
"By offering an opportunity for protection from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act
for information that qualifies under [Homeland Security Act] section 214, the Department [of
Homeland Security] will assure private sector entities that their information will be safeguarded
from abuse by competitors or the open market." Procedures for Handling Critical Infrastructure
Information; Interim Rule, 69 Fed. Reg. 8074, 8074 (Feb. 20, 2004).
54. Private industries have traditionally feared that voluntary disclosure of critical
infrastructure information to the federal government might waive any trade secret protection claims
or enable potential business competitors to access sensitive or confidential information via a FOIA
request. See id; see also Block, supra note 50. "[M]any industries don't trust the new department
to keep a secret." 1d.; see also Joseph Summerill, Is it Safe for Your Client to Provide the
Government with Homeland Security Data? 50 JAN. FED. LAWYER 24 (2003) (explaining that
private industry might refuse to voluntarily provide critical infrastructure information to the
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government and the public. Whether or not the Program achieves the
intended results, it reflects the culmination of administrative and
legislative efforts to provide a sound legal basis to protect sensitive but
unclassified information.55
D. The Convergence of the Freedom of InformationAct
and the Homeland Security Act
The power of the Program lies in the FOIA. None of the FOLA
exemptions specifically allow the federal government to withhold critical
infrastructure information. However, the Homeland Security Act56 relies
on the third FOIA exemption 57 to protect privately-held critical
infrastructure information from disclosure."
For all the focus on access to privately-held critical infrastructure
information, the Homeland Security Act seemingly ignores issues
surrounding the disclosure of government-held critical infrastructure
information. Assumedly, when the federal government receives a request
for critical infrastructure information, federal departments and agencies
need only to find a "sound legal basis" in order to justify applying a FOIA
exemption and withholding the information. Two post-September 11
federal district court cases, Coastal Delivery Corp. v. US. Customs
Service59 and Living Rivers Inc. v. US. Bureau of Reclamation,6"

government, notwithstanding protection promised by both the Homeland Security Act and possibly
FOIA exemption 4).
55. See Ashcroft Memo, supra note 32; see Card Memo, supra note 40.
56. Homeland Security Act of2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, §§ 211-215,116 Stat. 2135,215055 (2002).
57. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (2003). The FOIA allows federal agencies to withhold information
that another statute specifically prohibits from disclosure, "provided that such statute (A) requires
that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on the issue,
or (B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be
withheld[.]" Id.
58. The Critical Infrastructure Act of 2002 nondisclosure scheme "is in a statutory form that
is a 'growing trend,' in that it directly refers to the FOIA and thus is 'specifically focused on the
prohibition of disclosure under the FOIA' in particular." U.S. Department of Justice, Office of
Information and Privacy, FOIA Post, HomelandSecurityLaw ContainsNew Exemption 3 Statute
(Jan. 27, 2003) (citation omitted), at http://www.usdoj.gov/oip/foiapost/2003foiapost4.htm (last
visited Aug. 3, 2004); see also U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Information and Privacy,
FOIA Post, Agencies Rely on Wide Range of Exemption 3 Statutes (Dec. 16, 2003), at
http://www.usdoj.gov/oip/foiapost/2003foiapost41.htm (last visited Aug. 9,2004) (describing some
of the nearly 140 other exemption 3 statutes relied on by various federal agencies in fiscal year
2002).
59. 272 F. Supp. 2d 958 (C.D. Cal. 2003).
60. 272 F. Supp. 2d 1313 (Utah 2003).
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demonstrate how the Bush Administration's policy affects access to
critical infrastructure information held by the government.
EI. CASE STUDIES

A. Coastal Delivery Corp. v. U.S. Customs Service
This case, decided in 2003 by the U.S. District Court for the Central
District of California, marked the first post-September 11 decision sparked
by an agency's FOIA request refusal based on terrorism fears. 6 The U.S.
Customs Service (Customs) denied a FOIA request specifically because
terrorists might use the requested information, in conjunction with already
publicly available information, to calculate the vulnerability of certain
seaports.62 The district court upheld this Customs decision.63
When containers arrive at the Los Angeles/Long Beach seaport
(seaport), Customs sends certain containers to a Centralized Examination
Station for off-site inspection.' One of these Centralized Examination
Stations, NISCO Pacific Warehouse (NISCO), contracted with trucking
company Coastal Delivery Corporation (Coastal) to be the exclusive
transporter of the containers from the seaport to the warehouse.65 NISCO
breached this contract by hiring other trucking companies and in 1998,
Coastal won a lawsuit against NISCO.66 However, NISCO won a new trial
specifically to determine the amount of damages.67
To prepare for the new trial on damages, Coastal tried to obtain
information from Customs that it could not obtain from NISCO.6 8 One
month after the September 11 terrorist attacks, Coastal filed a FOIA
request with Customs to learn how many examinations Customs conducted
on containers arriving into the seaport during 1998, 1999, 2000, and
2001.69 After a series of denials and appeals to Customs, Coastal sued
Customs, hoping to have the information before the new trial on damages
61. U.S. Department of Justice, Office ofInformation and Privacy, FOIA Post, FOIA Officers
Conference Held on Homeland Security (July 3, 2003), at http://www.usdoj.gov/oip/foiapost/
2003foiapost25.htm (last visited Aug. 9, 2004).
62. CoastalDelivery Corp., 272 F. Supp. 2d at 960.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Coastal Delivery Corp., 272 F. Supp. 2d at 960.
68. Id.
69. Id.
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against NISCO began.7" Customs then produced charts showing the
numbers of containers examined both at the seaport and at off-site
Centralized Examination Stations over the four-year period.7' Customs
also produced a document entitled "Threat Assessment" that summarized
the charts in one sentence, stating how many containers Customs
examined at the seaport and at the off-site Centralized Examination
Stations.72 All of the numbers in the charts and the document were
redacted.73 The issue before the court on cross-motions for summary
judgment was whether Customs had improperly withheld the
information.74
Customs argued that "terrorists and others could use the information to
discover the rate of inspection and then direct their containers to
vulnerable ports."7 5 Based on this theory, Customs argued that FOIA
exemption 7(E)76 and exemption 2" allowed it to withhold the records.

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
withhold

Id.
Id.
CoastalDelivery Corp., 272 F. Supp. 2d at 960-61.
Id.
Id. at 962.
Id. at 960.
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(E) (2003). This exemption allows the federal government to

records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the
extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information...
would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or
prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or
prosecutions ifsuch disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention
of the law ....
Id.
77. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2). This exemption allows the federal government to withhold
information "related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency[.]" Id. Courts
consider "internal matters of a relatively trivial nature" to be "low 2" information and "more
substantial internal matters, the disclosure of which would risk circumvention of a legal
requirement" to be "high 2" information. Department of Justice, Freedom of Information Act
Guide, May2004, athttp://www.usdoj.gov/oip/exemption2.htm#N 5 (last visited Sept. 12,2004).
After determining which type of information is at issue, courts will analyze the information
accordingly to determine whether a federal agency may withhold the information. The district court
analyzed the information at issue in Coastal Delivery Corp. as "high 2" information. Coastal
Delivery Corp., 272 F. Supp. 2d at 965. The Department ofJustice's Freedom ofinformation Guide
reminds readers that
[w]ith the relatively recent development of both worldwide and domestic
terrorism, greatly heightened security awareness, and recognition of the
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The district court agreed.78 It held that Customs met the requirements of
FOIA exemption 7(E). 79 First, Coastal and Customs agreed that Customs
had a "clear law enforcement mandate. 8 1 Since the parties agreed on that
first point, the court next found that Customs demonstrated a rational
nexus between the information about the seaport inspections and Customs'
law enforcement mandate. 8 ' Finally, the court found that Customs had
proven that the release of the information would disclose guidelines for
law enforcement investigations or prosecutions and that such disclosure
would reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law. 2
The last point revolved around the idea that terrorists or smugglers
could use the information to determine which ports have weak security.
The public - and terrorists - already have access to the total number of
containers that pass through the seaport.8 3 The district court reasoned that
if Customs released the numbers of examinations conducted at the seaport,
terrorists could use that information in conjunction with the already
publicly available information to calculate the percentage of searches
conducted at the seaport.8 4 The district court stated that if it ordered the
information released in this case, other courts would likely release similar
information for other ports. In this way, the court reasoned, terrorists
could determine whether security was relatively weak at a particular port
and move contraband through that weak port. 6
Coastal contended that the idea that terrorists and criminals would
engage in such calculated risk assessment was "anything but reasonable. 8 7
Furthermore, Coastal argued that the implementation of anti-terrorism

concomitant need to protect the nation's critical infrastructure (both its elements
and records about them), [high 2 information] is of fundamental importance to
homeland security. It is important that all agencies consider Exemption 2 carefully
in properly assessing - and, where appropriate, withholding - sensitive critical
infrastructure information of current law enforcement significance.
Id.
78. Coastal Delivery Corp., 272 F. Supp. 2d at 966.
79. Id.at 965.
80. Id.at 963.
81. The district court found that the information sought by Coastal enabled Customs "to track
the overall effectiveness of its examination technique and evaluate both its commercial enforcement
strategy and its border security responsibilities." Id.
82. See id. at 963-65.
83. CoastalDelivery Corp., 272 F. Supp. 2d at 963.
84. See id. at 963-65.
85. Id.at 964-65.
86. Id.
87. Id.at 964.
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programs following September 11 rendered the old numbers useless to
those terrorists conducting risk assessment, since Customs had changed its
examination methods and beefed up security since September L88
However, the court found that Coastal failed to prove that terrorists would
not use the information to determine weaknesses at ports.89
The district court held that Customs also met the requirements of FOIA
exemption 290 because (1) the documents were predominantly internal and
(2) disclosure of the documents may risk circumvention of an agency
regulation, for the same terrorism-related reasons described above in the
exemption 7(E) analysis. 9 The district court noted that, in the Ninth
Circuit, Customs needed only to have met the second prong of this test. 92
Coastal filed a notice of appeal on May 16, 2003. 9' Coastal had also
filed a motion for reconsideration, which the district court denied in June
2003. 9' Just a few days after the Coastal Delivery Corp. decision, 95 the
U.S. District Court for the District of Utah decided Living Rivers, Inc. v.
U.S. Bureau of Reclamation,96 another case addressing access to critical
88. For example, Customs announced its Container Security Initiative in February 2002.
Press Release, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Customs Container Security Initiative to
Safeguard U.S., Global Economy (Feb. 22,2002), athttp://www.customs.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/
press releases/archives/2002/22002/02222002.xml (last visited Sept. 12,2004). Customs designed
this security initiative to secure maritime trade and ensure that oceangoing cargo containers were
not used in terrorist attacks by "(1) establishing security criteria to identify high-risk containers;
(2) pre-screening containers before they arrive at U.S. ports; (3) using technology to pre-screen
high-risk containers; and (4) developing and using smart and secure containers." Id.
89. CoastalDelivery Corp., 272 F. Supp. 2d at 964. "[Coastal] has offered no support for its
assertion that the new anti-terrorism programs would make the past trends in rate of examination
worthless to people trying to evade Customs laws." Id.
90. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2) (2003); see supra text accompanying note 77. The district court
analyzed the seaport information as "high 2" information, as it pertained to "more substantial
internal matters, the disclosure of which would risk circumvention of a legal requirement[.]"
Department of Justice, supranote 77. Therefore, the district court applied the test articulated by the
D.C. Circuit in Crooker v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms.Crooker v. Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 670 F.2d 1051, 1073-74 (D.C. Cir. 1981). The district court
determined that the documents were predominantly internal because they were "'designed to
establish rules and practices for agency personnel ... involving no "secret law"' that the agency
purports to impose on members of the public." Coastal Delivery Corp., 272 F. Supp. 2d at 965
(quoting Crooker, 670 F.2d at 1073).
91. CoastalDelivery Corp., 272 F. Supp. 2d at 965.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 966.
94. Id. at 966-68.
95. The U.S. District Court for the Central District of California decided CoastalDelivery
Corp. v. U.S. Customs Service on March 14, 2003. The U.S. District Court for the District of Utah
decided Living Rivers Inc. v. US. Bureau of Reclamation on March 25, 2003.
96. 272 F. Supp. 2d 1313 (Utah 2003).
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infrastructure information under the FOIA. The Living Rivers decision
again reflects "broad judicial deference to the [Bush] Administration's
expanded withholding under FOIA exemptions of a broad range of
information in the name of combating terrorism." 97
B. Living Rivers, Inc. v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation
The Moab, Utah-based non-profit group Living Rivers, Inc., uses
grassroots efforts to achieve river CPR - conservation, preservation, and
restoration by undoing damage from dams, diversions, and pollution.9"
After the September 11 terrorist attacks, the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation
(Bureau), part of the Department of the Interior, installed new emergency
security measures at major dams in the Colorado River system. 99 Living
Rivers adopted the view that the security measures were weakest at Glen
Canyon and Flaming Gorge dams, which were already the most
structurally vulnerable.' ° Living Rivers criticized the Bureau's focus on
around-the-clock security at the Hoover Dam, which it claimed was

97. LAWYERS COMM. FOR HuMAN RIGHTS, Assessing the New Normal,Liberty and Security
for the Post-September II United States, 90 n.22 (Sept. 2003), available at http://www.lchr.org/
pubs/descriptions/Assessing/Ch1 .pdf (last visited Aug. 9, 2004).
98. Living Rivers Colorado Riverkeeper Web Site, at http://www.livingrivers.org/mission.
cfm (last visited Nov. 7, 2004).
99. Press releases issued by the Bureau on September 12, 2001, and September 24, 2001,
describe some of the security measures that the Bureau took immediately for dams, reservoirs,
power plants, offices, and other facilities. For example, the Bureau temporarily closed visitor
centers, suspended tours, and restricted access to roads. Press Release, U.S. Department of the
Interior, Bureau of Reclamation, Reclamation Remains on High Security Alert (Sept. 12, 2001),
at http://www.usbr.gov/main/ news/newsreleases/news_2001/2001-09-12.html (last visited Aug.
9, 2004); Press Release, U.S. Department ofthe Interior, Bureau of Reclamation, Increased Security
Continues at Reclamation Dams, Reservoirs and Powerplant (Sept. 24, 2001), at http://www.usbr.
gov/main/news/newsreleases/news_200 1/index.html (last visited Aug. 9,2004). In the years since
the September 11 attacks, the Bureau has continued to institute various security measures
appropriate for specific areas. For example, the Bureau no longer allows underwater diving near
the Flaming Gorge dam. Press Release, U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Reclamation,
Flaming Gorge Dam Visitors Will Notice Changes Due To Security Provisions This Summer (June
10, 2002), at http://www.usbr.gov/main/news/newsreleases/news_2002/ 2002-06-10.htm (last
visited Aug. 9, 2004). The Bureau has also responded to alerts issued by the Department of
Homeland Security by limiting access to facilities and roads, closing visitor centers, and inspecting
vehicles. Press Release, U.S. Department ofthe Interior, Bureau of Reclamation, Increased Security
Implemented at Reclamation Dams, Reservoirs and Powerplants (Feb. 7, 2003), at
http://www.usbr.gov/main/news/newsreleases/news_2003/2003-02-07.htm (last visited Aug. 9,
2004).
100. Press Release, Living Rivers Colorado Riverkeeper, Dam Security Measures Flawed -Public Kept in Dark Over Risk (Oct. 10, 2001), at http://www.livingrivers.org/archives/article.cfim?
NewsID=48 (last visited Aug. 9, 2004).
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already more structurally sound than Glen Canyon and Flaming Gorge
dams, as an inefficient application of resources.' 0 ' Living Rivers claimed
that failure of Glen Canyon and Flaming Gorge dams, the two largest in
the Colorado River basin after the Hoover Dam, would cause
"catastrophic" damage to riverside communities, interstate highways,
oil
and gas pipelines, and the water supply systems of more than twenty-five
million people. 02
Living Rivers contended that Arizona's Glen Canyon Dam in particular
could fail on its own during a high-water event, regardless of a terrorist
threat.103 Living Rivers pointed to a 1998 Bureau of Reclamation study that
used a flood-forecasting computer program to evaluate the consequences
of the failure of Glen Canyon Dam, either by foundation failure or
overtopping"° resulting from the failure of Flaming Gorge Dam in Utah.0 5
The failure of Glen Canyon would send "an estimated 500-foot wall of
water" through the Grand Canyon toward Hoover Dam. 6 To inform the
public of the consequences of dam failure in these areas and to try to
nudge the Bureau toward fixing problems that Living Rivers claimed
existed pre-September 11,107 on September 19, 2001, Living Rivers made
a FOIA request to acquire inundation maps 10 8 for the areas below Hoover
Dam and Glen Canyon Dam from the Bureau.'09 The detailed maps depict
at-risk areas and specific sites, including critical infrastructure such as
power plants, that a dam failure and resultant flood would affect." 0
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Overtopping is the "flow of water over the top of a dam or embankment." Bureau of
Reclamation Glossary, at http://www.usbr.gov/mainilibrary/glossary/index.html (last visited Aug.
9, 2004).
105. Stephen E. Latham, Bureau of Reclamation, Glen Canyon Dam: Dam FailureStudy
(abridged), RIVER NEWS, July 1998, reprintedin Stephen E. Latham, LIVING RIVERS COLORADO
RIVERKEEPER, Nov. 1,2001, availableathttp://www.livingrivers.org/archives/article.cfm?NewsID
=537 (last visited Aug. 9, 2004).
106. Access Denied:No Release ofInundation Maps, LIVINGRIVERS CURRENTS, Dec. 1, 2003,
at http://www.livingrivers.org/archives/article.cfin?NewsID=545 (last visited Aug. 9, 2004).
107. See Press Release, supra note 100.

108. An inundation map is a map delineating the area that would be flooded by a particular
flood event. It includes the ground surfaces downstream of a "dam" showing the probable
encroachment by water released because of "failure" of a dam or from abnormal flood "flows"
released through a dam's spillway and/or other "appurtenant structures," such as outlet works,
"spillways," bridges, drain systems, "tunnels," towers. See Bureau of Reclamation Glossary,
supra
note 104.
109. Living Rivers, Inc. v. US. Bureau of Reclamation, 272 F. Supp. 2d 1313, 1315 (Utah
2003).
110. Id.
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The Bureau initially denied the request under the authority of FOIA
exemption 2."' Living Rivers filed an administrative appeal, which the
Department of the Interior denied, before filing suit in July 2002.12 The
district court granted the Bureau's motion for summary judgment,
effectively holding the maps exempt from disclosure not under exemption
2, but under exemption 7(F) instead.113
To qualify the maps for exemption 7, the LivingRivers court first found
that the Bureau is a mixed-function agency with both administrative and
law enforcement functions and it compiled the maps in accordance with
this role." 4 Furthermore, the Bureau uses the maps, for example, "to
develop its Emergency Action Plans and to protect and alert potentially
threatened people in the vicinity of the dams.""' 5 Next, to fit the maps
specifically into exemption 7(F), the Living Rivers court held that release
of the maps could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical
safety of any individual because a dam failure is a "weapon of mass
destruction[."" 6 Terrorists could use the maps to conduct risk assessment
111. Id. The FOIA protects information that is "related solely to the internal personnel rules
and practices of an agency" under exemption 2. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2) (2003); see supra text
accompanying note 77. The Bureau initially claimed that the maps were "high 2" information and
therefore could be withheld, because they related to the Bureau's internal practices and their
disclosure would risk circumvention of a statute or regulation. Living Rivers, 272 F. Supp. at 1315.
112. Living Rivers, 272 F. Supp. 2d at 1315.
113. Id. at 1322. FOIA exemption 7(F) allows the federal government to withhold "records
or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production
of such law enforcement records or information... could reasonably be expected to endanger the
life or physical safety of any individual[.]" 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(F) (2003). Living Rivers has stated
that "[u]ntil the trial[,] the Bureau's arguments for withholding the information had nothing to do
with national security." See Access Denied,supra note 106. However, FOIA directs district courts
to review agency decisions de novo and thus, "an agency may raise a particular exemption for the
first time in the district court." Living Rivers, 272 F. Supp. 2d at 1318.
114. Living Rivers, 272 F. Supp. 2d at 1318-19. The district court found that the Bureau's
"purpose in compiling the... [maps] fell within the sphere of its enforcement authority" because
the maps are "presently used and were compiled in direct relation to the [Bureau's] statutory law
enforcement mandate." Id.at 1318, 1320 (quoting Fine v. U.S. Dep't of Energy, Office of the
Inspector Gen., 823 F. Supp. 888, 907 (D.N.M. 1993)).
115. Id. at 1319.
116. Id.at 1321; but see WMD41 1, NTI, at http://www.nti.org/f wmd41l/flal.html (last
visited Aug. 9,2004). "The most widely used definition of 'weapons ofmass destruction' in official
U.S. documents is 'nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons[,] "' according to WMD4 11, a primer
on weapons of mass destruction prepared for the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) by the Center for
Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies. This definition has been
used by the President, the CIA, the Department of Defense, and the General Accounting Office.
NTI is a private organization, focused on reducing the risk of use and preventing the spread of
nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, which was founded by CNN founder Ted Turner and

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 16

and compare dams to learn which dam, if attacked, would yield the most
damage.'" 7 The Living Rivers court rejected the argument that the maps do
not increase
the likelihood or ease of an attack." 8 Living Rivers will not
9
appeal. 1
This case offers another example of a government agency relying on
terrorism fears to withhold critical infrastructure information that the
public may have used to force non-terrorism related safety improvements.
Had the Bureau been a private entity, the Bureau might have avoided the
FOIA request and litigation completely by stamping the maps "critical
infrastructure information" and handing it over to the Department of
Homeland Security under the new federal Protected Critical Infrastructure
Information Program.
IV. BACKGROUND ON ACCESS TO CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
INFORMATION IN THE STATES

The federal FOIA ensures access to information guarded by federal
entities only. 2 ° It does not provide the public with a right to access
information held by states or private entities. 2 ' Today, all states and the
District of Columbia have enacted open records laws.' 22
After Watergate, Congress and some states worked even harder to
ensure disclosure of information under the FOIA.'23 In contrast, after the

former U.S. Sen. Sam Nunn (D-Ga.) in 2001. See NTI Web Site, at http://www.nti.org (last visited
Aug. 9, 2004).
117. Living Rivers, 272 F. Supp. 2d at 1321-22.
118. Id. at 1322. The district court pointed out that Living Rivers did not put forth evidence
to support this or any of its arguments. Id. at 1319 n.5.
119. See LIVING RIVERS CURRENTS, supra note 106. "In this political climate Living Rivers
does not feel it likely that an appeal would overturn the verdict and is not pursuing the matter
further." See id.
120. Department of Justice, Freedom of Information Act Reference Guide (Nov. 2003), at
http://www.usdoj.gov/04foia/referenceguidemay99.htm#N-l_ (last visited Aug. 9, 2004).
121. Id.
122. States have a history of open government that stretches back prior to the 1966 passage
of the FOIA. Assurances of open government exist in the common law, in the first state laws after
colonization, in territorial laws in the west and even in state constitutions. All states have passed
laws requiring openness, often in direct response to the scandals spawned by government secrecy.
The U.S. Congress strengthened the federal Freedom of Information Act after Watergate, and many
states followed suit. THE REPORTERS COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, TAPPING OFFICIALS'
SECRETS, Introductory Note (4th ed. 2001), at http://www.rcfp.org/tapping/index.cgi?key=intro
(last visited Aug. 9, 2004).
123. Id.
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September 11 terrorist attacks, the federal government 24and some states"'
have increasingly restricted access to information. For example, between
September 11, 2001, and September 2003, thirty-six states had enacted
amendments to their open records laws to protect infrastructure and
security information related to drinking water systems from disclosure to
that this will prevent terrorists from accessing the
the public, on the theory
126
same information.

Since some of the changes to state laws are still fresh and are untested
in courts, there is no available case law based on challenges to these
laws.1 27 Texas, however, provides one example of a state with a new
statutory exemption for critical infrastructure information that operates
similarly to the federal scheme created by the Homeland Security Act and
the third FOIA exemption. Furthermore, Texas is possibly the only state
where a legal authority has produced even an informal opinion regarding
the application of such a statutory exemption.1 28 The Texas Attorney
General's Office has interpreted the application of the exemption for
critical infrastructure information at least five times since September 2003
via open records letter rulings. 129 This series of open records letter rulings
provides insight into how legal authorities, and eventually state and federal
courts, might interpret new laws that restrict access to critical
infrastructure information.130 Additionally, the available facts behind some
of these open records letter rulings exemplify how government agencies
such as the Brushy Creek Municipal Utility District could, perhaps
unintentionally, try to abuse the exemption.

124. See Ashcroft Memo, supranote 32; see generally Uhl, supra note 33 (chronicling postSeptember 11 changes to FOIA policy and concluding that those changes have eroded the power
of FOIA).
125. Analysis of post-September 11 changes to access laws in every state, even if limited to
changes in access to critical infrastructure information only, is outside the scope of this Note. See
supra text accompanying note 19. For current comprehensive research of changes in state freedom
of information laws, see University ofFlorida College of Journalism and Communications, Marion
Brechner Citizen Access Project, at http://www.citizenaccess.org (last visited Aug. 9, 2004).
126. See Cathy Atkins & Larry Morandi, Protecting Water System Security Information,
WATER SECURITY, Sept. 2003, at 1.
127. See supra text accompanying note 19.
128. See supra text accompanying note 19.
129. See supra text accompanying note 11; Texas Open Records Letter Ruling Nos. OR20038302 (2003)[hereinafter Brushy Creek], OR2003-6503 [hereinafter City of Waco], OR2003-7208
(2003) [hereinafter San Antonio Water System], OR2003-8462 (2003) [hereinafter Lower Colorado
River Authority], OR2004-0488 (2004) [hereinafter City of Irving].
130. Each open records letter ruling discussed in this Note contains the Texas Office of the
Attorney General's limitation on its applicability. See supra text accompanying note 11.
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V. CASE STUDY: INITIAL APPLICATION OF TEXAS,
§ 418.181 AND § 552.101

Following the addition of the new Texas Government Code provisions
governing access to critical infrastructure information, the City of Waco,
the San Antonio Water System, the Brushy Creek Municipal Utility
District, the Lower Colorado River Authority, and the City of Irving
attempted to invoke the statutes as a basis for withholding information
from the public. The Office of the Attorney General in Texas either forced
the disclosure of the information or allowed the government to withhold
it. Just as important as the outcome in each of these instances is the Office
of the Attorney General's consistent interpretation of the new statutory
scheme and its demonstrated awareness of the legislative history behind
the statutes.
The Texas legislature intended to model its freedom of information act
on the federal FOIA. 13 ' In June 2003, the Texas Legislature passed a bill
that amended its Government Code to include a chapter on Homeland
Security.' The code now defines critical infrastructure to include "all
public or private assets, systems, and functions vital to the security,
governance, 33
public health and safety, economy, or morale of the state or
1
the nation."'

The code also now includes a provision that makes certain critical
infrastructure information confidential.' 34 The provision works with the
existing state FOIA3 to directly prevent disclosure of critical

131. See TEx. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 552.101 (Vernon 2003). "The legislature enacted the Act
to conform loosely to the federal Freedom of Information Act." THE REPORTERS COMM. FOR
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, TAPPING OFFICIALS' SECRETS (4th ed. 2001), at http://www.rcfp.
org/tapping/index.cgi?key=TX38 (last visited Aug. 9, 2004) [hereinafter TAPPING OFFICIALS'
SECRETS]; See A & T Consultants, Inc. v. Sharp, 904 S.W.2d 668, 676 (Tex. 1995).
132. The 78th Legislature passed H.B. 9, which added Chapter 421 on Homeland Security to
the Texas Government Code. 2003 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 1312 (Vernon). The law also added
section 418.181. TEx. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 418.181 (Vernon 2003). See infra text accompanying
note 133.
133. TEx. GOv'T CODE ANN. § 421.001(2) (Vernon 2003).
134. Section 418.181 of the Texas Government Code states, "Those documents or portions of
documents in the possession of a governmental entity are confidential if they identify the technical
details of particular vulnerabilities of critical infrastructure to an act of terrorism." TEx. Gov'T
CODE ANN. § 418.181 (Vernon 2003).
135. Title 5, Chapter 552 of the Texas Government Code governs the availability of public
information. In relevant part, the law states, "Information is excepted from the requirements of
Section 552.021 if it is information considered to be confidential by law, either constitutional,
statutory, or by judicial decision." TEx. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 552.101 (Vernon 2003).
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infrastructure information when it identifies technical details of particular
vulnerabilities to terrorism. Just as the federal Homeland Security Act
depends on FOIA exemption 3 to allow the government to deny requests
for privately-owned critical infrastructure information that has been
submitted to the federal government, the Texas homeland security law
depends on the Texas FOIA provision 36 to37deny requests for governmentowned critical infrastructure information. 1
The first open records letter ruling from the Texas Attorney General's
Office came in September 2003, in response to an attempt by the City of
Waco, Texas, (Waco) to withhold critical infrastructure information under
this new statutory scheme.138 Waco sought to deny a request for the
number of smallpox vaccine doses the Waco-McLennan County Public
had received and administered as of the time of the
Health District
139
request.

Waco relied on the statutory scheme created by the general state FOIA
exemption and the new exemptions for critical infrastructure
information. 40 In defense of its position, Waco stated that the requested
information constituted "technical details which could be interpreted to be
singling out particular vulnerabilities of the city's and county's 'critical
infrastructure' . . . .,"'4' The Attorney General's Office, however, stated
that Waco did not explain "how the release of this information would
reveal technical details identifying vulnerabilities in the city's critical
infrastructure."' 4 2 Nevertheless, Waco could still withhold the information
pursuant to the state's emergency response provider statute. "'
One month later, in October 2003, the Attorney General responded to
a request for an open records letter ruling from the San Antonio Water
System (SAWS).'" SAWS had received a request from a former
136. See id.
137. "[S]ince § 552.101 exempts information deemed confidential-by gtatute, the legislature
can indirectly create other exceptions to the Texas Public Information Act without specifically
amending that Act." See TAPPING OFFICIALS' SECRETS, supra note 131, at http://www.rcfp.org/cgilocal/tapping/index.cgi?key=TX40 (last visited Nov. 10, 2004).
138. City of Waco, supra note 129.
139. Id. at 1.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. After the Texas Department of Health submitted comments pursuant to Government Code
section 552.304, the Office of the Attorney General determined that Government Code section
418.176 forbids disclosure of the information. City of Waco, supra note 129, at 2. The records at
issue were maintained by an emergency response provider and the release of the records would
"reveal the number of emergency response staff prepared to handle a smallpox outbreak." Id.
144. San Antonio Water System, supra note 129.
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employee, who sought information relating to e-mails sent to or by him
during his employment with SAWS.145 SAWS relied on other state
46
statutes, but not the critical infrastructure information exemption.147
Instead, the Attorney General's Office employed its statutory authority
to raise the new critical infrastructure information exemption on behalf of
SAWS. 148 The Attorney General's Office offered no further analysis of the
issue, leading to the assumption that any further discussion regarding the
information in the former employee's e-mails would divulge
vulnerabilities in SAWS' critical infrastructure.
In November 2003, the Attorney General's Office fielded two more
requests for open records letter rulings. The first of these requests came
from the Brushy Creek Municipal Utility District, discussed supra at Part
1.149 The other request came from the Lower Colorado River Authority
after it received a request for a copy of a map detailing its

telecommunication system. 150

The Lower Colorado River Authority' 5' appropriately invoked the
52
protection of the critical infrastructure information statutory scheme.
The Lower Colorado River Authority first explained that the system, made
of fiber optic cable and digital microwave, connects its administrative and
operational facilities, and transmits mobile radio traffic for public safety
departments.' 5 3 Next, the Lower Colorado River Authority stated that the
maps "reveal the physical locations of fiber routes and identify which
routes are protected and unprotected."' 5 4 Finally, the Lower Colorado
River Authority suggested that the information on the maps could aid
terrorists in destroying the telecommunication system, and this would

145. Id.at 1.
146. Id.at 1-4. See TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 552.107, 552.108, 552.111,552.137, 552.139
(Vernon 2003).
147. San Antonio Water System, supra note 129, at 6 n.3.
148. TEX. GOV'T CODEANN. §§ 418.181, 552.101 (Vernon 2003).
149. See discussion supra Part I.
150. Lower Colorado River Authority, supra note 129.
151. The Lower Colorado River Authority has responsibility for "delivering electricity,
managing the water supply and environment of the lower Colorado River basin, developing water
and wastewater utilities, providing public recreation areas, and supporting community and
economic development." LCRA Web Site, at http://www.Icra.org/about/index.html (last visited
Aug. 9, 2004).
152. Lower Colorado River Authority, supra note 129; see TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. §§
418.181, 552.101 (Vernon 2003).
153. Lower Colorado River Authority, supra note 129.
154. Id.
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compromise the security of communities that depend on the Lower
Colorado River Authority.'55
This step-by-step explanation of reasons for exemption of the maps
from public exposure satisfied the Attorney General's interpretation of the
statutory exemption."' The law in this case clearly achieved its purpose.
When comparing the application of the statute here with the attempted use
of the same statute to classify the Brushy Creek tennis courts as critical
infrastructure and the Brushy Creek security improvement contract as
critical infrastructure information, the potential for abuse of the exemption
becomes clearer.
Finally, in January 2004, the Attorney General's Office responded to
the City of Irving regarding a request for information about the locations
of buried utilities within 500-feet of a certain address. 157 Only one out of
the twelve utility companies potentially affected by the release of the
information argued that the location details were confidential critical
infrastructure information.'58 TXU Gas Company "expresse[d] concern
that its information might potentially reveal particular vulnerabilities of
critical infrastructure."' 5 9 However, the Office of the Attorney General
type of information" and
noted that the public already has access to "this
0
ordered the disclosure of the information.16
Although the Attorney General's Office did not have the opportunity
to decide whether the information would have been confidential had it not
already been publicly available, the gas company tried to claim the
exemption even though the information only "might potentially" reveal
critical infrastructure weaknesses. 16' Had the information been eligible for
the exemption, the Attorney General's Office would have had to consider
whether this attenuated argument might have satisfied the statutory
requirements. Based on the invocation of the new access laws and the
factual scenarios presented so far, the Attorney General's Office certainly
will be confronted with a similar question in the future.

155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Id.
Id.
City of Irving, supra note 129.
Id.
Id. at 2 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
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VI. ANALYSIS
The issue is how to balance the public's ability to access critical
infrastructure information for the purpose of monitoring government with
the government's ability to protect the public by withholding critical
infrastructure information. Georgetown University law professor Viet D.
Dinh, whose responsibilities as the former U.S. Assistant Attorney General
for Legal Policy included the implementation of the USA PATRIOT
Act, 162 responded to the question of whether restrictions on access to
critical infrastructure information are actually effective in combating
terrorism. 163 Professor Dinh noted that the public's ability to access critical
infrastructure information certainly serves democratic purposes."
However, after September 11, that open access also provides a "road map"
for terrorists.' 65 "How we go about balancing and making sure that
information is controlled, but that people have access to it in order to have
effective democratic use, is a very difficult question," Professor Dinh
said. 166
Ideally, restrictions on access could be effective terrorism prevention
tools. However, even when applied appropriately, such laws could prevent
the public from monitoring critical infrastructure to ensure that the
government attends to any known weaknesses, as Living Rivers argued in
Living Rivers Inc. v. U.S. Bureau ofReclamation.167 While common sense
provides that terrorists, smugglers, and other criminals certainly do
conduct risk assessment using public information, terrorists could still
attack critical infrastructure, such as a dam, without acquiring documents
that were made public via a federal or state open records request.
Furthermore, as a consequence of the decision in CoastalDelivery Corp.
v. U.S. Customs Service, 168 the public cannot monitor the rate of Customs

162. Pamphlet, University of Florida Law Review Presents Viet D. Dinh, Dunwody
Distinguished Lecture in Law, Nationalism in the Age of Terror (Feb. 27, 2004) (on file with
author).
163. Georgetown University Law Center Professor Viet D. Dinh, Question and Answer
Session Following Speech on "Nationalism in the Age of Terror" at the University of Florida Law
Review Dunwody Distinguished Lecture in Law (Feb. 27,2004) (video available in the University
of Florida Levin College of Law Media Center).
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. 272 F.Supp. 2d 1313 (Utah 2003).
168. 272 F. Supp. 2d 958 (C.D. Cal. 2003).
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inspections at the seaport. 169 In contrast, when TXU Gas Company tried to
force the City of Irving to withhold information related to the location of
buried utilities because terrorists might target them, the Texas Attorney
General's Office rejected this argument in favor of disclosure. 7 '
The decisions by the federal district courts in Living Rivers and Coastal
Delivery Corp. both reflect an implicit deference to the policy change
advocated by the Ashcroft memo.'71 However, the instructions from the
Bush Administration for federal agencies to withhold information
whenever there is a "sound legal basis" for doing so are tempered by a
clear message from some members of Congress. For example, in 2003 the
House of Representatives Committee on Government Reform specifically
rejected Ashcroft's approach, stressing that the FOIA sets a standard
leaning toward disclosure. 7 2 "Contrary to the instructions issued by the
Department of Justice on October 12, 2001, the standard should not be to
allow the withholding of information whenever there is merely a 'sound
legal basis' for doing So.''173 Thus, those courts and administrative
agencies that have yet to interpret a new state or federal provision
restricting access to critical infrastructure information should consider the
position of the House Committee on Government Reform in contrast to the
position of the White House.
Courts and administrative agencies will initially have to determine
whether the information at issue even pertains to critical infrastructure
when applying a statutory exemption for critical infrastructure
information. The Brushy Creek tennis courts, for example, should not
qualify as critical infrastructure under any federal or state definition.'74 In
contrast, the Lower Colorado River Authority's telecommunication system
clearly qualified as critical infrastructure and the information in that
instance was properly withheld.'75 The Texas Office of the Attorney
General issued about 9400 open records letter rulings in 2003.176 The
vigilance and awareness of the Texas office, in light of the number of open

169. "A reporter hoping to evaluate how thoroughly the Customs Service checked containers
would also not be able to see the records under [the Coastal] decision .... Rebecca Daugherty,
'Securing' the Public With Secrets, 27 NEWS MEDIA & L. 34 (2003).

170. City of Irving, supra note 129; see discussion supra Part 5.
171. See Ashcroft memo, supra note 32.
172. See Citizen's Guide on FOIA, supra note 29. The House of Representatives Committee
on Government Reform first published the Citizen's Guide on FOIA in 1977, and since then
thousands of people have relied on it to learn how to request records from federal agencies. Id. at 1.
173. Id. at 3.
174. Brush Creek, supra note 129.
175. Lower Colorado River Authority, supra note 129.
176. Attorney General of Texas, supra note 11.
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records letter rulings it issues, should provide a model for courts and other
administrative agencies when interpreting and applying statutory
exemptions similar to the one in Texas.' 77
Neither CoastalDeliveryCorp. norLivingRiversinvolved the question
of whether the information at issue actually pertained to critical
infrastructure. The seaport and dams at issue in CoastalDelivery Corp.
and Living Rivers, respectively, clearly qualified as such. Had the
Homeland Security Act applied to information held by government
entities, the information at issue in CoastalDelivery Corp. and in Living
Rivers would likely have qualified under the statutory definition of
"critical infrastructure information." 7 ' Since the Homeland Security Act
only applies to information owned by private entities, the government had
to rely on the courts' interpretations of FOIA exemptions. Thus, the
federal district courts might have interpreted the FOTA exemptions in light
of the Ashcroft Memo's prod to employ a sound legal basis to withhold
information, although neither the courts nor the parties mention the memo.
These federal court decisions signal adherence to the Bush
Administration's policy changes. The Living Rivers court relied less on the
necessity of the particular inundation maps in locating dams and power
plants and more on the "terrorist card"' 79 played by the Bureau of
Reclamation. 8 The Bureau reasoned that "if the maps fell into the hands
of a terrorist... [the maps] would give the terrorist information about the
amount of damage that could be caused by destroying a dam." '8 1 Also, the
Bureau argued that "the inundation maps could be used to identify critical

177.

See supra Part V.

178. The Critical Infrastructure Information Act of 2002 defines critical infrastructure
information, in part, as "information not customarily in the public domain and related to the
security of critical infrastructure or protected systems ... " Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub.
L. No. 107-296, § 212(3), 116 Stat. 2135, 2151 (2002).
179. See Daugherty, supra note 169.
[I]n [CoastalDelivery Corp. v. U.S. Customs Service and Living Rivers Inc. v.
U.S. Bureau of Reclamation], the government has used a "national security"
excuse to invoke the law enforcement exemption to the FOI Act, denying
information that would have likely been released if the government had not played
the "terrorist" card to justify use of the exemptions.

Id.
180. In its opinion, the district court relied on the declaration of Larry L. Todd, director of
security, safety, and law enforcement for the Bureau of Reclamation, although the district court
stated that it would not give "special deference to Mr. Todd's Declaration." Living Rivers, Inc. v.
U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 272 F. Supp. 2d 1315, 1319 n.4 (Utah 2003).
181. Id. at 1315-16.
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infrastructures, buildings, and facilities which would be destroyed by
attacking the dam. This information is also valuable to terrorists."' 8 2 The
application of this line of reasoning follows the Ashcroft Memo's
instructions to withhold information whenever there is a "sound legal
basis" for doing so.
If a clearer exemption for critical infrastructure information had been
available in the federal system, the inundation maps in Living Rivers might
have easily slid into it, even without the exaggerated comparisons of dams
to weapons of mass destruction. Since no FOIA exemption exists for
critical infrastructure information, courts can still join the House
Committee on Government Reform in rejecting the argument that a sound
legal basis is enough to withhold information.
VH. CONCLUSION

The Texas open records letter rulings reflect the determination of one
state's legal officials to interpret and apply the new critical infrastructure
information exemption laws evenly. They also highlight the reasons why
the public might want access to information about the number of smallpox
vaccines available or weaknesses in water and utility systems. While only
private entities will be able to withhold such information under the new
federal Protected Critical Infrastructure Information Program, the federal
court system has demonstrated a commitment to employing existing FOIA
exemptions to allow the government to withhold its critical infrastructure
information, possibly leaving little chance for the public to access any
critical infrastructure information.
Finally, the instance in Brushy Creek leaves little doubt that some
government agencies will at least try to play the "terrorist card" to prevent
the public from accessing information. To prevent such attempts from
forming precedents, astute courts and legal officials will need to commit
to a fair application of laws restricting critical infrastructure information
and compare the public's need for the information with the threat that a
terrorist will attack the Brushy Creek tennis courts.

182. Id. at 1316.

178

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LAW& PUBLICPOLICY

[Vol. 16

